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Enlightenment Liberalism, Lawyers, and the
Future of Lawyer-Client Relations
ROBERT F. COCHRAN,JR.*

To some, this conference's focus on Enlightenment liberalism may
seem somewhat esoteric, the stuff of ivory tower academics. But
liberalism is the air in which people in the West-and increasingly the
rest of the world-breath. It affects the way we view almost every aspect
of life.
I am going to address, from a Christian perspective, liberalism's
relationship to the role and responsibility of the lawyer. Whether a United
States lawyer could define Enlightenment liberalism or not, it is likely that
the role he or she plays as an attorney every day was in large part shaped
by liberalism's focus on individual autonomy. At the request of the
conference organizers, I am also going to reflect on the future of lawyerclient relations.
Liberal Lawyering - I begin with a story of law practice from legal aid
lawyer and community organizer Steven Wexler.' At a welfare rights
organization meeting, a woman asked the group for help. She had a
malnourished child. The group went into the emergency ward of a local
hospital, stopped a doctor, and demanded that he examine the baby. The
doctor, through halting English, explained that malnutrition was not an
emergency and that the baby should go to the medical clinic on Monday
morning. The group surrounded the doctor and ordered him to examine
the baby. "He did so, and, though he could not be forced to prescribe
anything for the baby, he was induced to write the mother a note
indicating that she had been to the emergency room and should be seen
first at the Monday clinic." Wexler concludes:
I will not try to pick out the point at which I ceased to be emotionally in
favor of the action; somewhere along the line my sympathy for people
who have trouble speaking English, my faith in the doctors who had

been so nice to a white boy in the suburbs,.

.

. and many other feelings

of mine which the ladies did not share made me wish that I did not have

* Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law and Director of the Herbert and Elinor
Nootbaar Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics. The arguments made in this
Speech are more fully developed in THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR.,
LAwYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. West 2009).
1. Steven Wexler, PracticingLaw for PoorPeople, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053-54 (1970).
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. I would never have thought of the relief that the

ladies finally obtained. But forcing the doctor to write that note was a
real victory for the ladies. No lawyer has a right to deny them that
victory by structuring the alternatives as he sees them or by denying the
ladies the chance to choose their own way and use their lawyer to
achieve their end. A lawyer must help them do their thing, or get out.2
Wexler's type of practice is unlike that of most lawyers, but his
explanation for his actions is not. The lawyer's job is to empower the
client. "A lawyer must help [clients] do their thing, or get out." The
lawyer's goal is the liberal ideal, the client's autonomy.
Liberal lawyering is rooted in two liberal doctrines emphasized
earlier in this conference by Bruce Frohnen: (1) respect for human
dignity will yield an objective of personal autonomy' and (2) government
2. Id. at 1064-65.
3. See Bruce Frohnen, Is ConstitutionalismLiberal?, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. _ (2011).
Immanuel Kant believed that autonomy would automatically lead to moral decisionmaking. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORAlS 59 (Lewis Beck
trans., 1959). But his notion of autonomy was a far cry from the radical individualism of
modern liberalism. For Kant autonomy was the absence of any influence other than
reason and he believed that morality would follow automatically from reason.
[Tihis "ought" [the moral law] is properly a "would" that is valid for every
rational being provided reason is practical for him without hindrance [i.e.,
exclusively determines his action]. For beings who like ourselves are affected
by the senses as incentives different from reason and who do not always do that
which reason for itself would have done, that necessity of action is expressed
only as an "ought."
See id. at 67-68. Anything that interfered with one's ability to act rationally interfered
with one's autonomy and therefore one's ability to act morally. The following section
from Kant suggests the value of moral influence (from whoever the "we" is that is doing
the "presentling]"):
When we present examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in following
good maxims, and of sympathy and general benevolence even with great
sacrifice of advantages and comfort, there is no man, not even the most
malicious villain (provided he is otherwise accustomed to using his reason),
who does not wish that he also might have these qualities. But because of his
inclinations and impulses he cannot bring this about, yet at the same time he
wishes to be free from such inclinations which are burdensome even to himself.
Id. at 73. A Kantian attorney who had a goal of client autonomy might properly seek to
assist clients in freeing themselves from their "inclinations and impulses" and other
things that might interfere with autonomy and moral action. There are problems with
Kant's assessment of the moral life. First, it is unrealistic. No one is free from his or her
senses. This is a moral theory for a world that does not exist. Second, freedom from the
senses would remove from people one of the most valuable sources of moral
understanding and one of the most effective incentives toward moral action--empathy.
Empathy moves us toward seeing the other person as our equal and drives us to care for
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can be based on self-interest.' Liberalism sees the primary good as
freedom. In contrast, law practice rooted in a Christian understanding
teaches that (1) respect for human dignity yields community and moral
responsibility; (2) government must be based on virtues of the people and
this should be reflected in choices made in the law office. Christianity
also values freedom, but recognizes that true freedom requires community
and moral responsibility.
The moral rationale for liberal lawyering was articulated by Monroe
Freedman:
One of the essential values of a just society is respect for the dignity of
each member of that society. Essential to each individual's dignity is the
free exercise of his autonomy. Toward that end, each person is entitled
to know his rights with respect to society and other individuals, and to
decide whether to seek fulfillment of those rights through the due
processes of law ....

[Tihe attorney acts both professionally and morally in assisting clients to
maximize their autonomy....

[Tihe attorney acts unprofessionally and

immorally by depriving clients of their autonomy, that is, by denying
them information regarding their legal rights, by otherwise preempting
their moral decisions, or by depriving them of the ability to carry out
their lawful decisions.'
Freedman roots his theory in a liberal view of the US constitution.
"[L] awyers' ethics is rooted in the Bill of Rights and in the autonomy and
the dignity of the individual."' Under this view of lawyering, the lawyer's
moral task is to protect clients from the influence of others, so that clients
will make their own rules, be their own rulers. Liberal lawyering
reinforces liberal culture, a culture where we live in what Alasdair
MacIntyre describes as a society of strangers.
Liberal lawyering theory yields its own school of client counselingthe "client-centered" school.' As one client-centered lawyer text puts it:
the other person. In addition, reason by itself will get you nowhere. It requires a moral
starting place. By itself, it provides no reason to be other than self-serving. Reason is a
tool that can be used for evil as well as good purposes.
4. See Frohnen, supra note 3.
5. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 57 (1990).
6. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS vii (3d ed.
2004).
7. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 156 (2d ed. 1984).
8. See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (2d ed. 2004); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENTCENTERED APPROACH (1991); DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
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"Because client autonomy is of paramount importance, decisions should
be made on the basis of what choice is most likely to provide a client with
maximum satisfaction."9
When a decision is to be made in legal representation, the clientcentered lawyer and the client list on a sheet of paper all of the
alternative courses of action and the "consequences to the client" of
each.'0 The client makes choices in that light. The client-centered
counselors claim to be neutral, but in fact, their decision-making
framework steers the client toward making self-serving choices. It
imposes a regime of client autonomy-clients are directed to make
choices based on consequences to themselves. Clients are a bundle of
rights and liberal theory suggests that the lawyer should enable them to
become more and more independent of others. The Enlightenment liberal
ideal is C.S. Lewis's picture of hell from "The Great Divorce": Autonomous
people on the outskirts of a city who continually move further and further
away from one another."
Of course, client autonomy has its costs, most obviously costs to
other people, and to their relationships. In the malnourished child story,
Steven Wexler advocates client autonomy for a group of powerless clients,
but he and others also advocate autonomy for powerful clients. In his
case, a goal of client autonomy led to a small amount of harm to others:
The doctor was harassed, his patients were delayed, and the clinic's
patients lost their places in line on Monday morning. Because Wexler's
clients had little power, their small claim to autonomy did little harm. But
client autonomy for those with great power (those who produce
dangerous products, have many employees, or have a great impact on the
environment) can result in great harm to others. Ultimately, liberal
lawyering is likely to advance the autonomy of those who can afford
lawyers at the expense of those who cannot.

COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D.
HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE
REPRESENTATION (1990).
9. BINDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 261; see also BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 8, at

256.
10. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 8, at 184; BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 8, at
246-49; BINDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 307.
11. C.S. LEWIS, THE GREAT DIVORCE 18-19 (1946).
12. Wexler, supra note 1, at 1063; Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, 85 YALE LJ.
1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities,1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 613, 616-19 (1986).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss3/10

4

Cochran: Enlightenment Liberalism, Lawyers, and the Future of Lawyer-Clien

2011]1

LIBERALISM'S RELATIONSHIP TO LAWYERING

689

In some situations, it may be that the client-centered counselors'
focus on client empowerment is justified. Generally, poor people need
empowerment. In those cases in which the lawyer represents a poor
client against a rich opponent, there is probably little need for the poor
client to worry about the interests of the rich opponent-the rich
opponent will likely have plenty of lawyers to look out for his interests.
But when the lawyer represents the wealthy client against the (often
unrepresented) poor party, the lawyer's exclusive focus on client
autonomy is likely to result in injustice. If clients with great power
make decisions based solely on "consequences to the client" they can
cause great harm to others.
Authoritarian Lawyering - Just as liberalism arose in reaction to
the authoritarianism, liberal lawyering arose in reaction to authoritarian
lawyering. Liberal lawyers distinguish themselves from lawyers who
assert control of legal representation.
The early American
gentleman-lawyer asserted control of legal representation based on his
superior social status, superior influence, superior intelligence, and
superior moral sensitivity. The mid-nineteenth century drafters of the
earliest American professional responsibility statements, trusted lawyers,
not clients, to look out for the common good. "It is the duty of counsel,"
George Sharswood said, "to be the keeper of the conscience of the client;
not to suffer him through the influence of his feelings or interest to do or
say anything wrong."13 David Hoffman disapproved of lawyers who
invoked statutes of limitation or the law of infancy to defeat otherwise
valid claims. He said of his client who wanted him to make such a claim,
"He shall never make me a partner in his knavery."" Judge Clement
Haynsworth, a modern lawyer/gentleman (quoted by Monroe Freedman
as an example of authoritarian lawyering) put it, "[Tihe lawyer must
never forget that he is the master. He is not there to do the client's
bidding. It is for the lawyer to decide what is morally and legally
right.... ,,15
Some are surprised that as a Christian I do not advocate an
authoritarian approach to lawyering. If a lawyer knows that he is right,
13. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854); 32 GEORGE
SHARswOOD, REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASS'N (1907), quoted in THOMAS L. SHAFFER,
AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS (1985).
14. David Hoffman, Resolutions on Professional Deportment, in 1 DAVID HOFFMAN, A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. 1836), quoted in SHAFFER, supra note 13.
15. Clement F. Haynsworth, Professionalism in Lawyering, 27 S.C. L. REV. 627, 628
(1976), quoted in FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 52. For a more developed critique
of the authoritarian approach, see SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note *, at 30-41.
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shouldn't he make sure that the client does the right thing. But there are
troubling aspects of the authoritarian approach. Such an approach is
inconsistent with the humility with which lawyers should view
themselves and with the dignity which they should seek for their clients.
There is danger that the lawyer will be wrong. Moral issues in legal
representation are often difficult. None of us has perfect ability to
discern moral standards or to determine how they should apply. There
is a danger that lawyers will be confident of their moral judgment when
confidence is not justified. Generally, two consciences in conversation
are more likely to get to moral truth than one.
In addition, the authoritarian lawyer is likely to impose her values
on the client. Authoritarian lawyering is inconsistent with client dignity,
inconsistent with love of neighbor, inconsistent with a recognition of the
client as a fellow child of God. The authoritarian lawyer robs the client
of the opportunity to grow morally. People grow morally through
exercising moral judgment. They develop virtues through practice, as an
athlete develops physical skills through practice. Lawyers who prevent
clients from moral exercise-from deliberating, making moral
judgments, and acting on them-deny clients the opportunity to
become better people.
Collaborative Lawyering - In my view, the relationship between
lawyer and client should be a collaborative one. 16 Tom Shaffer and I
have used the analogy to friendship as a means of understanding how
lawyers should counsel clients. Lawyers should advise clients about
moral issues that arise in representation in the way that friends advise
friends, raising such issues for serious discussion, but not imposing their
will on the client. " This model is based on Aristotle's notion that
friendship includes a concern for the goodness of the friend. He argued
that friends collaborate in the good. " As John Inazu noted earlier in
this symposium, freedom of conscience itself is an inherently

16. See, e.g., JAMES E. MOLITERNO & JOHN M.
(1993); ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., ET AL., THE

LEVY, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER'S WORK
COUNSELOR-AT-LAw:

A

86

COLLABORATIVE

(2d ed. 2006).
17. See Thomas L. Shaffer, A Lesson From Trollope, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 727
(1978); SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note *, at 42-65; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 131-32 (1993).
18. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VIII (Martin Oswald trans., Bobbs-Merrill
Co. 1962).
APPROACH TO LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
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communitarian concept.' 9 Our consciences are formed in community
with others as we influence them.
This notion of friendship differs in important respects from the way
that people commonly understand friendship today. Robert Bellah and his
colleagues describe the most important difference as follows:
The traditional idea of friendship included a shared "commitment to the
good."
For Aristotle and his successors, it was precisely the moral
component of friendship that made it the indispensable basis of a good
society. For it is one of the main duties of friends to help one another to
be better persons: one must hold up a standard for one's friend and be
able to count on a true friend to do likewise. Traditionally, the opposite
of a friend is a flatterer, who tells one what one wants to hear and fails to
tell one the truth. 0
The moral value of friendship is something that has been neglected in
recent ethical theory (possibly because of the liberal obsession with
autonomy and notion that people must be careful lest they be influenced).
Anthony Kronman identifies sympathy and detachment as two
qualities that make the counsel of both friends and lawyers valuable.
Friends take each other's interests seriously and wish to see them
advanced; it is part of the meaning of friendship that they do. It does not
follow, however, that friends always accept uncritically each other's
accounts of their own needs. Indeed, friends often exercise a large degree
of independent judgment in assessing each other's interests, and the
feeling that one sometimes has an obligation to do so is also an
important part of what the relation of friendship means. What makes
such independence possible is the ability of friends to exercise greater
detachment when reflecting on each other's needs than they are often
able to achieve when reflecting on their own. A friend's independence
can be of immense value, and is frequently the reason why one friend
turns to another for advice. Friends of course expect sympathy from
each other: it is the expectation of sympathy that distinguishes a friend
from a stranger. But they also want detachment, and those who lack
either quality are likely to be poor friends.'
The collaborative lawyer engages in moral conversation with the
client but generally leaves decisions to the client. These conversations
are like the ordinary conversations we have with family and friends. We

19. See John Inazu, Between Liberalism and Theocracy, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV.
(2011).
20. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT
AMERICAN LIFE (3d ed. 2008).
21. See KRONMAN, supra note 17, at 131-32.
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propose, try out, suggest, and listen. We rarely issue moral
pronouncements arrived at "independently" and outside of ordinary,
tentative, mutual conversation.
Friends raise moral issues, without imposing their values on each
other. As Jeremy Taylor, a seventeenth-century bishop and Cambridge
fellow said:
Give thy friend counsel wisely and charitably, but leave him to his
liberty whether he will follow thee or no: and be not angry if thy counsel
be rejected... He that gives advice to his friend and exacts obedience to
it, does not the kindness and ingenuity of a friend, but the office and
pertness of a schoolmaster.22
(By the way, as a schoolmaster, I acknowledge Taylor's implicit point
about schoolmasters. Lawyers and fathers are not the only ones who
tend to act paternalistically. I like to think of myself as a schoolmaster
as friend.)
One of the best ways to raise moral concerns in the law office is by
asking questions which come naturally in the course of decision-making.
As to each alternative under consideration, the lawyer can ask the client,
"What will be its effect on other people?" The lawyer and client should
consider all of the consequences that might arise from various
alternatives, not (as with client-centered lawyers) merely the
consequences to the client. The lawyer might also ask, "What would be
fair?" Such questions call on clients to draw on their own sources of
moral values.23
Such discourse is unlikely in the liberal lawyer's office. The language
of autonomy and self-fulfillment gives us little basis for making
collaborative moral decisions. In our popular anthropology, individuals
make moral decisions all alone, freeCor so they thinkCfrom moral
influence. We need to recapture the ability to work together, to humbly
seek after the good.
Differences in power between lawyer and client may make
collaboration difficult. There is a danger that either the lawyer or the
client will dominate the other. The lawyer may have to work hard to

22. JEREMY TAYLOR, A DISCOURSE OF THE NATURE, OFFICES AND MEASURES OF
FRIENDSHIP (2010), quoted in Robert J. Condlin, "What's Love Got To Do With It?" "It's Not

Like They're Your Friendsfor Christ's Sake": The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer
and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211, 263 (2003).
23. For discussion and an example of how such a conversation might be structured,
see SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note *, at 66-86.
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develop the mutuality that is necessary for moral discourse. She may
need to empower the weak client and assert herself with the strong one.
The Future of Lawyer/Client Relations - The organizers of this
conference asked me to play the prophet, to speculate on the future of
the legal profession. I must warn you that my attempts at prophecy in
the past have not been very successful. I will mention only my attempts
a few decades ago to predict the future of two then-new beverage
ventures. I predicted that both the corner vendors of expensive coffees
and the vendors of water in plastic bottles would be failures. Contrary
to my vision of the future, people today drink a lot of Starbucks coffee
and bottled water. Thankfully, we do not kill our unsuccessful
prophets, as was the practice in ancient times.
Nevertheless, I will take my shot at the future of lawyer/client
relations. In my view, lawyer/client relations tend to reflect the culture.
In a more authoritarian age, lawyers were directive. In a liberal age,
lawyers defer to client autonomy.
The future of lawyer/client
relationships may turn on the future of human relationships in general,
and the future of moral friendships in particular.
One gauge of the future is the movies we watch. Like law, movies
influence and are influenced by the surrounding culture. As my friend
Drew Trotter, the Executive Director of the Consortium of Christian
Study Centers, has noted, movies are made by creative people who pay
special attention to the interests of the people within a culture. Each
year Drew prepares a lecture entitled, "The Movies and America: What
the Academy Award Nominees for Best Picture Tell Us About
Ourselves."
This year, a central theme in the movies that people watched was
the tension between personal autonomy and personal relationships. Six
of the ten Best Picture nominees centered on family 4 and four on
friendship.25 The two pictures that most people predicted would win
best picture, "The Social Network" and "The King's Speech" were all
about friendship.
"The Social Network" is about the shallow nature of friendship in
the modern world. It opens with college student and future Facebook
founder Mark Zuckerberg being dumped by a girl friend. She asks if
they can just be friends. He says, "I don't want to be your friend." She
24. These movies include: Black Swan, The Fighter, Inception, The Kids Are All Right,
127 Hours, and Winter's Bone.
25. These movies include: The King's Speech, The Social Network, Toy Story III, and
True Grit.
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says, "I was just being polite. I don't really want to be your friend
either." Zuckerberg becomes obsessed with status (possibly to fill a need
for family and friendship), seeking admission to an elite Harvard club
and creating Facebook. He has many relationships, but no real friends,
despite the movie's tagline: "You don't get to 500 million friends
without making a few enemies." At the end of the movie, he has the
liberal ideal, complete autonomy, but he has no friends. He pauses for a
rare reflective moment, goes on Facebook, and asks his original
girlfriend to be his friend. The movie ends as he continually hits the
refresh button to see if she has responded.
"The King's Speech" is a story of friendship. At the insistence of his
wife, the future King George VI, goes to see Lionel Logue, a speech
pathologist. Lionel insists that they share a personal relationship of trust
and equality. Over the future king's objections, Lionel refers to him by
his family name, "Bertie." Much of the movie is built around Bertie's
difficulty adjusting to the notion of equality. Friendship is something
new to the king. At one point of high stress, Lionel offers Bertie a drink
of malt liquor. When Bertie objects, Lionel says "That's what friends are
for." Bertie responds, "I wouldn't know."
Consistent with Aristotle's notion of friendship, Lionel is more than
a technical advisor. He encourages Bertie to step up to the challenge of
being king. He encourages Bertie to show courage when faced with the
challenge of leading his nation through World War I over the then-new
social medium-"the wireless" (radio). This movie's tagline is: "It takes
leadership to confront a nation's fear. It takes friendship to conquer
your own." Following the king's first triumphant speech, he says to
Lionel, "Thank you, my friend." Lionel responds, "Thank you, your
majesty," suggesting that friendship can exist even in a ruler/subject
relationship.
The films that filmmakers chose to make and that Americans chose
to watch this year, suggest that we are rethinking our obsession with
individual autonomy. It is right that we do so. We were made for
relationships, with God, with family, and with friends. It may be that
relationships will make a comeback.
I began with a story in which the moral was that lawyers should
help clients "do their thing, or get out." My hope is that lawyers will give
clients help in determining what "their thing" is. I hope that the lawyer as
friend (and I don't mean the lawyer as Facebook friend) will emerge as
the dominant lawyer model, despite all of the cultural forces weighed
against it.
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